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INTRODUCTION
This appeal involves two issues.

The first is whether the

South Mountains of Mayflowerf s property were actively devoted to
an agricultural after Gillmor stopped herding his animals there.
If the South Mountains were used for agricultural purposes, then
the

second

issue

is whether

grazing

activity

on

all

of

the

Mayflower properties satisfied the production requirements of the
post-1993 Farmland Assessment Act.

Since Mayflower has not proven

agricultural use of the South Mountains, the Court need not address
the production requirement issue.
In defending the Tax Commission's decision in this appeal, the
Tax

Commission

approaches.

and

Neither

Mayflower
however

take
relies

significantly
simply

on

suggested by the Tax Commission's findings below.

different

the

approach

This divergence

of approaches, without more, raises questions about the soundness
of the Tax Commission's finding of agricultural use in the South
Mountains

and

of

compliance

with

the

post-1993

production

requirements.
A.

Agricultural Use In The South Mountains.

Mayflower's claim of agricultural use in the South Mountains
is based on the testimony of Luke Gillmor, the herder on the
property.

According to Gillmor, he grazed his animals on all of

Mayflower's property until approximately 1989.

At that time, he

stopped herding animals in the South Mountains because of the

dangers posed by marauding dogs and encroaching development.1

Any

animals that wandered into this areas were quickly recovered and
returned to the safe grazing areas located east and north of the
South Mountains. See Countyf s Opening Brief at 12-14 (detailed
description of herding practices with appropriate reference to
record).
The only animal contact with the South Mountains occurred when
a few animals would occasionally elude the herders and briefly
wander on ground dangerously close to civilization.

The record

reflects no other animal contact with any portion of the South
Mountains.
Although

animal

contact

with

the

South

Mountains

was

accidental, unintentional and indeterminate, the Tax Commission
found that the entire 1,495

acres of the South Mountains was

"actively devoted to an agricultural purpose" and was "land used

In its brief, the Tax Commission states:
Denny Lytle, an agricultural economist with the
Tax Commission testified that when dogs attach
a herd of sheep "it's usually a bloody mess."
(Tr./Lytle at 154.) The dogs, he testified,
"usually go on a killing spree; they don't just
kill one -- and eat it. They -- they'll go
through and rip and slash and kill any number
when they get going." (Tr./Lytle at 154. ) Mr.
Lytle testified that the effect [of] this
killing can be devastating to a livestock
operation "[e]specially the sheep industry,
with the lamb prices and the wool prices being
as low as they are, you can't afford
substantial predator losses. . . . " (Tr./Lytle
at 154).
Tax Commission Brief at 9-10.

2

for agricultural purposes,"

It however made no effort to explain

how these contacts support a finding that the entire 1,495 acres
of the South Mountains were used for agricultural purposes.

It

also made no attempt to reconcile its ruling to the plain meaning
of the constitution and statute.
Unlike
position

in

its

Decision

this

appeal

below,

the

is

urge

to

Tax
the

Commission's
Court

to

primary
create

a

"reasonable efforts" exception to the constitutional and statutory
agricultural

use

requirement.

Tax Commission

Brief

at

p. 13.

Implicit in this approach is recognition that actual agricultural
use in the South Mountains stopped.
For its part, Mayflower claims that Gillmor's decision to stop
herding animals in the South Mountains is not a change in use
justifying rollback tax. Mayflower Brief at 12.

Mayflower also

claims that grazing only stopped in the Bonanza Flats area, not the
entire South Mountains. _Id. at 13.
Neither

the

Tax

Commission's

nor

Mayflower's

claims

are

consistent with the constitution's and statute's language plainly
requiring

actual agricultural use, not merely efforts at use.

Moreover, Mayflower's efforts to limit the area of non-grazing to
the Bonanza Flats area is not supported by any evidence in the
record, nor endorsed by the Tax Commission findings below or brief
in this appeal.

For these reasons, and as discussed more fully in

this brief, the Court must reverse the Tax Commission's decision
and enter judgment that no agricultural use occurred in the South
Mountains.

3

B.

Mayflower's Compliance With The Post-1993
Assessment Act's Production Requirements.

Farmland

If the South Mountains are actively devoted to an agricultural
purpose, then the issue becomes whether Mayflower has proven that
Gillmor's grazing used more than half the grazing capacity of the
land.

Mayflower however has not fulfilled this burden because it

has failed to prove the capacity of the ground grazed.

For this

and other reasons, the Tax Commission findings of compliance must
be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I.

AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE SOUTH MOUNTAINS WERE NOT USED FOR
AGRICULTURAL PURPOSES.
The Tax Commission's findings establish that Gillmor no longer

herded his animals in the South Mountains. Order ("Reconsideration
Order") at p. 3 [R. 3A] ("Mr. Gillmor did attempt to keep them from
the area because of the encroachment of civilization, including
dogs which chase the animals.").

Despite this fact, the Tax

Commission found agricultural use because "some of the sheep and
cattle may have wandered onto that property from other property, ff
Findings

of

Fact,

Conclusions

of

Law

and

Final

Decision

("Decision") ir 16, p. 8 (emphasis supplied) [R. 91], and because
"the animals did occasionally graze that area." Reconsideration
Order at p. 3 (emphasis supplied) [R. 3A]
As a matter of law, the Tax Commission's findings establish
the

absence

of

agricultural

use

in

the

South

Mountains.

Agricultural use under the Utah Constitution and the Farmland
Assessment

Act

requires

purposeful

4

agricultural

activity.

Agricultural use does' not exist when sheep or cattle, eluding their
masters, occasionally wander on property.

As a result, the Tax

Commission finding of agricultural use in the South Mountains is
erroneous as a matter of law,
A.

The Plain Meaning Of The Utah Constitution And The
Farmland Assessment Act Requires More Than Unintended And
Occasional Wandering of Unspecified Numbers Of Animals.

To qualify for greenbelt protection, the Utah Constitution and
the

Farmland

Assessment

Act

unambiguously

require

rather than accidental, agricultural activity.

purposeful,

Specifically, the

Utah Constitution Article XIII § 3(2) permits the exemption for
11

[1]and used for agricultural purposes." This provision limits the

Legislature's power to exempt agricultural property from a full
fair market value assessment. Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission
(Bell Mountain), 819 P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1991).
Consistent with the constitution, the Farmland Assessment Act
makes agricultural use a prerequisite to greenbelt protection.

In

the pre-1993 Act, the Legislature extended the exemption to land
"actively devoted to agricultural use." Utah Code Ann. § 59-2503(1)(b) (pre-1993).

In both the pre- and post-1993 versions of

the Act, the Legislature provided that "[l]and in agricultural use"
means "land devoted to the raising of useful plants and animals."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502(1)(a) (pre- & post-1993).
The plain meaning of the Utah Constitution and the greenbelt
statute

require

statutes'

intentional

critical

terms

action.

are:

5

The

"actively,"

constitution's
"devoted,"

and

"use,"

"agricultural," and "purpose."2 On their face, these terms require
that the use, at minimum, be purposeful.
Nothing

in

agricultural use.
clear that

the

record

supports

a

finding

of

purposeful

In fact, the Tax Commission's own findings make

the herder did

not want the animals in the South

Mountains and made every effort to keep them out of this area.
Reconsideration Order at 3 [R. 3A]

Some animals did occasionally

evade the herders but were quickly retrieved.

Such

contacts

however do not evidence purposeful agricultural use.
Absent

purposeful

agricultural

use, the

Tax

Commission's

finding of agricultural use is erroneous as a matter of law.
B.

Agricultural Use On A Portion Of A Tract Cannot Bootstrap
Non-Productive Areas Onto Greenbelt.

In Salt Laket County v. Tax Commission (Bell Mountain), 819
P.2d 776 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court made clear that the
agricultural use of a small portion of a larger tract could not be
used to bootstrap nonproductive areas into the greenbelt. _Id. at
780.

Nonproductive areas do not qualify for greenbelt unless they

are "reasonably required for the purpose of maintaining the land
actually devoted to production." _Id. at 779.

The Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977) defines:
(1) "active" as "characterized by action rather than contemplation
or speculation . . . expressing action as distinct from mere
existence or state . . . marked by vigorous activity," (2) "devote"
as "to give over (as to cause, use, or end) wholly or purposefully,
<land devoted
to agriculture>," (3) "use" as "the act or practice
of employing something," (4) "purpose" as something set up as an
object or end to be attained: INTENTION," and (5) "agriculture" as
"the science or art of cultivation the soil, producing crops, and
raising livestock."

6

The Utah Supreme Courtf s holding
follows

from

the plain meaning

in Bell Mountain merely

of the constitution

that only

permits an exemption for "land used for agricultural purposes."
Non-productive land, even if part of a larger productive tract of
land, is not land used for agricultural purposes unless it somehow
contributes to agricultural activity.

In the instant case, the

South Mountains did not contribute to the grazing activity since
the herder tired to keep his animals off this land.
C.

An Abandoned, Historical Use Of The South Mountains As
Part Of An "Agricultural Unit" Does Not Satisfy The
Agricultural Use Requirement.

The

Tax

Commission

and

Mountains

and

the

Mayflower

other

Mayflower

argue

property

that

the

functioned

South
as

an

agricultural unit, and must therefore be considered as a whole.
Having created a unit, they then rely on evidence of grazing on
areas other than the South Mountains as evidence of agricultural
use on the South Mountains. Tax Commission Brief at 26.
The Court should reject appellees' efforts to avoid proof of
agricultural

use

in

agricultural unit.
explain how

the

the

South

Mountains

by

relying

on

an

The Tax Commission and Mayflower no where

South Mountains

can be part

of

a

functional

agricultural unit when the herder tries to exclude the property
from his operations.

Moreover, the Utah cases make clear that

operation as a "farming unit" does not satisfy the agricultural use
requirement for property that is not actually used for agricultural
purposes or that does not reasonably contribute to the agricultural
land.

Stated in the words of the Utah Supreme Court in Bell

7

Mountain, agricultural use of a smal1 portion of a larger tract
cannot not be used to "bootstrap" nonproductive

areas into

the

greenbelt.
T

~ Bell Mountain,

the Court referred

context that makes clear i " >u *

f

to

"unit farm"

does not eliminate the need for

actual
Court

*™ a

: t- ; *
expressly

held

that

-

constitutional authorization : article 3'*
i mp1erne .

•

could be bootstrapped

.:. * ei,«

the

section 3(2) and of the
actual agri cu3 11 11: a 3 i Ise

onto

,

»f agricultural property

and

thereby spread the preferential tax assessment to a wi de area," Id.
a I: > 80 (emphasis supp3 i ed )

Tl m is

t::I: le absei ice acti lal i lse pr ecludes

greenbelt treatment.

The Court f s

* i i ng was:

This acreage is not reasonably required for the
purpose of maintaining the land actually
grazed, not does it in any way support activity
oi i that land.. Under these circumstances, :i t
cannot be successfully maintained that such
acreage is in agricultural use. Furthermore,
the seven separately described tracts were not
ever part of a unit farm . . . .
For all that
appears in the record, the seven parcels may
have been acquired by the taxpayer at different
times and the only relationship between them
is simply that they meet each other at one or
more of their corners. We do not believe that
it was the intent of the constitutional
authorization in article 13, section 3(2) and
of the implementing statues that tracts not in
actual agricultural use could be bootstrapped
onto a core of agricultural property and
thereby spread the preferential tax assessment
to a wide area.
Id. at 7 79-80.
8

In

Board of Equalization v. Utah State Tax Commission(Judd),

846 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1993), the issue was whether the subdivided
lots used for agricultural should be included with the farmer?s
other

land

requirements.

to

meet

the

statute's

5-acre

and

production

The issue was not whether the ground had in fact

been used for agricultural purposes.4
In addressing the 5-acre and production requirement, the Judd
Court held that since the ground was being "farmed as a single
agricultural unit," each of these requirements could be satisfied
by looking at all the land that had been used as a unit. Judd,
supra, 846 P.2d at 1296.

The Court also noted that, even though

portions of the land had changed owners, the farmer had regained
possession, had fenced the entire acreage as one contiguous unit,
and had treated as a "single agricultural unit." _Id. at 1296 n. 4.
The Judd case is therefore different from the instant case where
Gillmor no longer treated

the South Mountains as part of the

farming unit.
The Tax Commission and Mayflower read too much into Bell
Mountain and Judd.

Stripped to its essence, appellees1 position

is that, once property has been used as a unit, it remains a unit

The farmer in Judd had received greenbelt on his land,
but later sold a portion of the land to a developer. The developer
installed curbs, gutters, and utilities and reconveyed to the
farmer. The farmer sold some of the lots, but continued farming
activity on the unsold lots. Among other things, the County argued
that the subdivided property that was for sale as residential
property could not be actively devoted to agricultural use. The
Court rejected this contention because multiple use property
qualified for greenbelt. Id. at 1296.

9

f o r e v e r e v e n if t h e farmer stops u s i n g t h e p r o p e r t y a s
surprisingl''

-t

i hn < •, ii ,<«s i ii i 11 t • iif IJ n > i i ,' tin 11 11 s e n s e l e s s

result.

A s B e l l M o u n t a i n a n d Judd m a k e c l e a r , a c t u a l u s e a s a uilit i s
required to qualify for greenbe]*

** a b a n d o n e d , h i s t o r i c a l u s e is
\u ldiin) a n i m a l s iij the South

n o t sufficient

M o u n t a i n s , t h e s e m o u n t a i n s c a n n o t be part ol t h e farming u n i t .
i1

ilia A g r i c u l t u r a l U s e R e q u i r e m e n t Is Nni Satisfied. B y A
H e r d e r ' s "Reasonable E f f o r t s " T« U s e T h e Land F o r
Agricultural Purposes.

T h e T a x C o m m i s s i o n u r g e s t h e Coin t t o c r e a t e a p u b l i c policy
e x c e p t i o n to t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l u s e r e q u i r e m e n t for
"reasoi

*'

• sr

for agricultural purposes. Tax

C o m m i s s i o n B r i e f at 2'I.

reasonable efforts" exception however

h a s n o b a s i s in, and i s i n c o n s i s t e n t with,

i ha pi mi a lanqiitnja UJ

the, 111 .ill Cnastiiuil m i iiini ilic iKarmland A s s e s s m e n t A c t .

T h e Court

should t h e r e f o r e r e f u s e t o r e c o g n i z e s u c h a n e x c e p t i o n .
The

THX C o m m i s s i o n

Legiiil.r
The

offers

t h e Faiinlanrl

Assessment

'u.'t "' a

support its "reasonable e f f o r t s " e x c e p t i o n .

Utah

Supreme

Court

and

this

Court

howevei

made

unequivocall

: 1 eai

consi is r..i'

. •/ c o m e i n t o play when the i I atutory l a n g u a g e is

a m b i g u o u s . I n r e W o r t hen,
1996 ) .
I'OIISI

This

i I ml m n

tha t

I eq islnl iwi>

have

a i an1r y

or

policy

1996 W L 605216 p. IV (Utah, O c t o b e r 2 2 ,

i •-• particularly

tin- »"'• •• • • J s * a i p i a 1 i i ly

« ! ie

.iee Salt Lake C i t y v . O h m s , 8 8 1 P. 2d 8 4 4 , 8 5 0 n. 14

(Utah 1994).
As shown above, the

i<" r I M'.

"""ati Constitution

«!inl I;ai in I riiui Assessment Act unambiguously require that the land be

Utah

actually

used

for

an

agricultural

purpose.

Nothing

in

the

constitution's or statue's language even remotely suggests that the
use requirement can somehow be satisfied by unsuccessful, but
"reasonable efforts" at agricultural use.

The Tax Commission has

shown and makes no effort to show ambiguity on this issue.
In addition, the Tax Commission no where explains how the
Legislature, regardless of the important public policy served, can
create

an

exemption

Constitution.

broader

than

authorized

by

the

Utah

The constitution only permits special treatment for

"land used for agricultural purpose." A "reasonable efforts" would
unconstitutionally permit an exemption for property not in fact
used for agricultural purposes as the constitution requires.
The Court should disregard the Tax Commission's references to
Legislative History or Public Policy as a basis for creating a
"reasonable efforts" exception. Cf. Judd, supra, 846 P.2d at 1297
(refusing

to ignore plain language of Farmland Assessment

Act

notwithstanding Legislature's apparent, but unexpressed, policy
goals).
E.

The Farmland Assessment Act Has Only One Standard For
Determining The Existence Of Agricultural Use.

Mayflower

contends

that

the

standard

for

determining

agricultural use may different if the owner is trying to establish
greenbelt status as opposed to maintaining it. Mayflower's Brief
at 12.

Mayflower however provides no basis for this supposed

distinction nor does it state what the different standards would
be.

The Court should therefore reject this argument.

11

F.

The Record Does Not Support The Tax Commission's
Of "Grazing" In The South M o u n t a i n s .
Commission characterizes the animal activity
:i

South M o u n t a i n s as "grazing
it suggests agricultural activity
support

il"

term "(ji a/ i mj

Claim
*

the

•

- se

US<M

lowever, the evidence does not

i he "i jraz i no" characterization.

The record contains undisputed evi dence 1:1 1a t -

•: xl mi tj c !:

Park City, Deer Valley, and the State Park forced Giilmor to stop
"" 1l

herdi :i lg 1 li s ai il ma I

South Mountains.

D o g s from these areas

would attack Gillmoi .; herd destroying h i s sheep and his
margin.

Because

of

this,

Giilmor

stopped

grazing

the

profit
South

andered there.
i rl r . /Giilmor 2 2 - ^ ,
- i* •
test_

73-74.
**

:..

^./Lytle

Commission cites

^

testimony as showing
I !c i ii I t a I i i s ] "l1"1 •

Tax

selected
Mount a J ins

s

cw<

o* the same
* ~>

Tax commission tsrier

to T r . / G i i l m o r at 24-25, 41J, 65-66.

area. "

•.. ) 5

;

Tt however characterizes this

that "animals still grazed the area
"' ' i l i 1 l e i iMiiil! Iniiii h i 1 1 ;

Commission

Brief

at

26-27

references however do evidence

[South

i»t ' J i p e p FA\I I I q r . t z c M i

Tl: : =

Tax

"grazing"

in

I tie

Commissioi •
the

South

In I In t.< , 'Rii-ei p i s (l (ii I I IIIU i lostii ied: •-' • '•'

I

Sheep that had gotten iii the South M o u n t a i n s had
"strayed off," had gotten there on their own, and had to
b e brought back. (Tr./Giilmor at 2 4 - 2 5 ) .

2.

it w a s not "practical to use [the] South Mountains to any
substantial amount" because of recreationers and d o g s .
(Tr./Giilmor at 4 2 ) . This portion of the transcript does

T h e County's opening brief contains G i i l m o r f s testimony
verbatim. C o u n t y 1 s Opening Brief at 2 6 - 3 3 .
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not refer to "grazing," nor describe the animals1 contact
with the South Mountains.
3.

In

Developments in Park City and Deer Valley created problem
with dogs. (Tr./Gillmor at 65-66). This portion of the
transcript does not refer to "grazing," nor describe the
animals' contact with the South Mountains.

light

of

the

foregoing,

characterize

the

animal

the

contact

Tax
with

Commission
the

cannot

South

fairly

Mountains

as

"grazing."
G.

Mayflower's Claim of Grazing On The South Mountain
Canyons and Slopes Leading to Bonanza Flats Has No
Support In The Record.

Mayflower takes a different approach to the testimony on the
South Mountains.

It claims that the encroachment of civilization

affected the grazing on only the Bonanza Flats1 portion of the
South Mountains and that Gillmor continued to use the other areas
of

the

"slopes

South Mountains.
and

canyons"

Specifically,

leading

Mayflower Brief at 4, 8, & 13.

to

Mayflower

Bonanza

Flats

claims
were

that

grazed.

However Mayflower's citations to

record do not support this contention. Mayflower Brief at 4, 8, &
13 citing Tr./Gillmor at 22-27.
Pertinent portions of Gillmorfs testimony on grazing in the
South Mountains focus on Exhibit 2, a map of the Mayflower property
before the condemnation and construction of the new US 40.

A copy

of this exhibit is attached to this brief.
On this map, a blue shaded area is identified as "Mayflower
Properties (other)."

This blue shaded area is south and west of

the density determination area and is referred to in this case as
the "South Mountains."

Included within the blue shaded area is
13

Bonanza Flats. (Tr./Gillmor at 23)
Gillmoi '
" s testimony

about his inability

to x ise the areas

within the blue shaded area, the South Mountains, is unequivocal.
Gillmor Testimony (Direct examination

>. 23 1. i/ to 25 1. 1.

o

in the ordinary year, do you move the sheep up the
mountain side towards Bonanza Flats?

A

We haven't been, for a number of years•

Q

And why 1 las that beei i t:t le case?

A

We n.-L... - ±ot of problems when we had the sheep up there
with
first of all, there's - - there's only one small
spring on this blue area, that's not sufficient to water
a large herd of sheep and the sheep have to go off, like
at this Midway Reservoir or somewhere. And we had - - i t
was hard to keep the sheep on there, and -- but more so,
we had a lot of problems with wild -- or domestic dogs
that were coming from Park City and attacking the sheep.

Q

Okay,

A

And then also, we, as time went on, from this State park,
there's a lot of people up there and a lot of people use
this property for recreation and it's — it's hard to
graze the sheep in there when there's so many people just
doing all sorts of different types of recreational
activities.

Q

When did that, (inaudible) you've just described, the
dogs, for example, or the people engaged in recreational
activities, when did that become a serious interference
with putting sheep in those areas?

A

Well, it was, right at the time when we had sheep iip
there in the -- in the latter part of the "80's, and it's
just -- it -- the last couple years that we actually had
sheep camp up there and it became so we figured it was
more problem than it was worth to try and graze on it.
With the -- you know, with the whole herd.
We still have stock that periodically have came up onto
the -- came up these canyons, especially sheep, because
sheep's natural tendency is to climb up and through all
the years, we've periodically had to come up onto this
blue area and bring back sheep that have strayed off and
gone
14

Q

Gone up on their own?

A

Yes,

Gillmof Testimony (Direct examination) p. 31 1. 5 to 31 1. 13.
Q

Looking at the blue area on this map that we've described
before, the more mountainous terrain extending up toward
Bonanza Flat; do the cows use that property for grazing?

A

Very little.
canyons.

Q

What do you do when that happens?

A

Well, we usually get a phone call, like from Deer Valley
and have to go — to go get them and drive them back,
using those areas?

But cattle do sometimes climb up these

Gillmor Testimony (Cross examination) p, 73 1. 16 to 74 1. 1.
Q

Okay. Thank you. I think your testimony was that on the
west side across -- on the west; side across the Mayflower
interchange, if you will, that the animals primarily
stayed within the little bowl — or not — I shouldn't
say little, but in - within that bowl that's right on the
west side of the road; is that correct? Right around the
mine area?

A

Up —
yes.

Q

Okay. You'll get some that will graze up, or higher, but
you have to bring those back down into that area; is that
correct?

A

Yes.

by the confines

where I've outlined it on the map,

Contrary to Mayflower's assertion, this testimony establishes that
grazing ceased on the entire South Mountains, not just the Bonanza
Flats area.
The Tax Commission's findings also reflect that the entire
South Mountains were effected by the encroachment of civilization.
Specifically, it held that "there was significantly diminished use
for the South Mountain area beginning
15

in approximately

1989."

Reconsideration Order
Decision or Reconsideration Order does i: :

i t:..i Bonanza Flats

area differently from 1:1ie remainder of the South Mountains,
ASSUMING THAT THE SOUTH M 0 U N T A I N S S A T I S F I E D T H E AGRICULTURAL
USE REQUIREMENT, MAYFLOWER HAS FAILED TO PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH
THE PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS OF THE POST-1993 FARMLAND
ASSESSMENT ACT.
If the South Mountains were used for an agricultural purpose,
the issue becomes whether Mayflower proved compliance wit)
p i ociui i

Under

inn

r e < j n i i IMIHMI I i. <i!

I I i• pu1 I

Act

must

the

Mayflower

P I ' I I1 a IMIIIII I . null

first

establish

capacity of all Mayflower property including
It must thi mi

till: :ia t

.

i\!-i!jessm*lir

the

the
t.

productive

r<* South Mountains,

... ,OL-V .*., « ,*s t 50% of ti lat

productive capacity.
Mayflower failed to satisfy this burden with respect to either
of t:l lese elenei I ts

Ii I f a ::: I:

1:1 ie Tax G Dmmi ssi • ::)i I ' s x i :i ] :i i lg f i i id i i ig

compliance with the production requirements incorrectly placed the
burden

on the County.

'.:.<_

nmission's errors, in part, are the resul t o £ i ts

unwillingness to correct its misunderstanding of the evidence on
both capacity and usage.

It compounded this error by I mplicitly

ignoring the error and simply pressing head with a fla/ized analysis.
As a result, the Tax Commission's findings concerning compliance
are hopeless

confused

and

do not contai n

subsidiary

findings

sufficient to reveal the findings internal logic.
Because of

•h.•

confusion, neither Mayflower nor the Tax
in I

i ni in

I ( i m p I I1 i i n i "i
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i mi ni in ni i inn i ,

!nasfMl

i mi ni

i in

Commission's

supposed analysis. Tax Commission Brief at 36-43;

Mayflower Brief at 14-20. In fact, after trying to justify its
ruling, the Tax Commission seeks to sustain its ruling by having
this Court make a factual finding based on evidence and a theory
not even mentioned in either its Decision or Reconsideration Order.
Tax Commission Brief at 44-45.
For all these reasons and as more fully discussed below, the
Court must reverse the Tax Commission's finding of compliance with
the production requirements of the post-1993 Act.
A.

Mayflower Has Not Filed A Cross-Appeal And Therefore
Cannot Challenge The Tax Commission's Decision.

In its decision, the Tax Commission held that compliance with
the

post-1993

production

requirements

comparing AUM capacity with AUMs used.

would

be

determined

by

The Tax Commission found

that the AUM capacity of the Mayflower property was Graze II, and
that acres classified Graze II could sustain .63 animals a month.
Mayflower

has not

filed

a cross-appeal

challenging

these

factual findings, nor has it attempted to marshall the evidence to
show these findings are not supported by substantial evidence. See
Glezos

v.

Frontier

Investments,

896

P.2d

1230

(Utah

App.

1995)(refusing to consider issues raised in untimely cross appeal).
Mayflower thus cannot urge the Court to overturn these findings.
B.

Mayflower Cannot Challenge The Foundation For The Graze
Classifications.

Mayflower seeks to challenge the foundation for the graze
classifications on the property grazed by Gillmor. Mayflower Brief
at 16-17.

Mayflower however did not object to this evidence when
17

it was offered and therefore cannot challenge its admission now.
(Tr./Brugner at 321-22)

Even if the challenge had been preserved,

Mayflower could not raise it absent a timely filed cross-appeal.
See Glezos, supra.
C.

The Tax Commission's Computation Of The Property's AUM
Capacity Fails To Account For The Capacity Of All Acres
Grazed.

The Tax Commission's decision properly recognized the need to
include all land grazed in computing AUM capacity. Decision at ir
24, p. 10.
land

owned

ownership.

This
by

means that AUM capacity is based not only on the
Mayflower

but

all

land

grazed

regardless

of

Although recognizing this need, the Tax Commission

failed to include all land grazed in its AUM computation and thus
understates the AUM capacity.
In the Tax Commission's lexicon, land in agricultural use
includes all land where animals may have wandered despite the
herder's best efforts.

This means that the Mayflower property and

the South Mountains are included, and that Gillmor f s property in
Summit County is included.
area is included
there.

It also means that the Deer Valley ski

since Gillmor admitted

that animals wandered

It also means that the land on the west side of US 40 north

of the Mayflower mine is included since Gillmor testified that
animals wandered there.

It also means that the land on the east

side of US 40 between Mayflower's north and south parcels is
included since Gillmor testified that animals wandered there.
Having identified the land grazed, the next step is to compute
the number of acres in the areas grazed.
18

The record does contain

evidence of the acres within the Gillmor and Mayflower property.
Mayflower however presented no evidence of the acreage of the other
land where animals may have wandered.

Without this information,

it is not possible to compute AUM capacity on the land grazed.
The Tax Commission's findings do not contain an understandable
explanation of how the Tax Commission determined the number of
acres grazed.

See County's Opening Brief at p. 38-42, 44-47.

In

defending the finding, neither Mayflower nor the Tax Commission
itself can explain the number of acres used. See Mayflower' s Brief
at 21-22, Tax Commission's Brief at 36.
In its brief on appeal, the Tax Commission's counsel provides
an itemization of the total acres grazed.

This acreage however is

not the same as that found in the Tax Commission's own decision.
More importantly, this itemization is limited to the acres "owned"
by Mayflower

and

Gillmor

and

does not take

into

account

the

additional land that was not owned by either Gillmor or Mayflower
but that Gillmor testified his animals went on.
additional

acres,

the

Tax

Commission's

latest

Without these
computation

understates AUM capacity.
Mayflower had
grazed.

the burden of proving

the number

of acres

It however offered no evidence of the number of acres

grazed other than those owned by Mayflower and Gillmor.

Since

these acres are necessary to establish AUM capacity, this failure
of proof means that Mayflower did not proved its entitlement to
greenbelt protection.

19

D*

The Tax Commission Erroneously Put The Burden of Proof
On The County.

At trial, Gillmor identified his general grazing pattern in
a peanut shaped outline. (Tr./Gillmor at 65, Ex. 109) This outline
did

not

include

the

South

Mountains.

The

County's

expert

determined the acres within this outline to be 4,714. (Tr./Wood at
182-87, Ex 112c).
The County's evidence was the only evidence of the number of
acres grazed by Gillmor.

The acreage relied on by Mayflower and

the Tax Commission merely reflect acres owned, not the total acres
grazed.

If the County's evidence was defective, then there was no

evidence of the number of acres grazed

and Mayflower's

proof

failed.
The Tax Commission however used this absence of proof as a
basis for ruling against the County.

It therefore improperly

placed the burden of proof on the County.

See County's Opening

Brief at 35-36.
E.

The Parties Valuation Stipulation Did Not Establish The
Number of Acres Grazed.

During

the

formal

hearing,

stipulation

to

resolve

the

stipulation

determined

the

Mayflower's property.
number

of

Mayflower.

acres

issue

the
of

parties

entered

value.

[R.

valuation

and

into

106]

acreage

size

a

This
of

The stipulation however did not identify the

grazed

by

Gillmor,

as

opposed

to

owned

by

The stipulation thus is not evidence of the number of

acres grazed.
Although raised by the Tax Commission and Mayflower, the
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Commission's use of the stipulation is not critical.

Even if the

stipulated acres for the South Mountains is included in the Tax
Commission's

computation,

Mayflower

does

not

satisfy

the

AUM

requirements. County's Opening Brief at 41.
F.

The Tax Commission's Computation Of AUMs Used Is Not
Supported By Substantial Evidence.

Once the AUM capacity of the grazed land is determined, the
next step is to compute the AUMs used by Gillmor.

AUMs used is

determined by the grazing duration, animal type, and numbers of
animals.

The Tax Commission found the AUMs used were 1725 based

on a hypothetical.
of 1590 AUMs.

The evidence however only supported a finding

See County's Opening Brief at 42-43.

In this appeal, the Tax Commission does not defend its finding
by justifying the 1725 computation.

Instead, it computes a range

of AUMs usage suggested by the evidence. Tax Commission Brief at
41-43.
somewhat

The high end of this range was based on very general, and
unclear

testimony

of

Gillmor

on

direct

concerning the duration and number of cows grazed.
the

range

examination.

was

based

on

very

specific

examination

The low end of

testimony

on

cross

Based on these range of AUMs used, the Tax Commission

concludes its 1725 computation was supported by the record.
The Tax Commission conclusion is based on a misunderstanding
of the substantial evidence standard.

Under this standard, the

Court considers evidence on both sides of the issue and only
affirms the agency's decision if the "quantum and quality of the
relevant evidence . . .

is adequate to convince a reasonable mind
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to support the conclusion," Utah Association of Counties v. Tax
Commission, 895 P.2d 819, 812 (Utah 1995).
Considering

the evidence on both

sides of this issue, a

reasonable mind would not be convinced by the general testimony
cited by the Tax Commission but would rather be convinced by the
specific

information

elicited

on cross examination.

The

Tax

Commission's findings on AUM usage is therefore not supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole.
G.

The Tax Commission's Finding of Compliance With The Act's
Production Requirements Is Not Supported By Adequate
Subsidiary Findings.

As shown above and discussed in the County's Opening Brief at
47-48, the Tax Commission's finding of compliance with the Act's
production requirements is not supported by adequate subsidiary
findings.

It is simply not possible to tell how the Tax Commission

arrived at its computation of the acreage grazed.

Similarly, it

is not possible to understand the basis for its computation of AUMs
used, especially

why

it rejected

Gillmor's

specific

testimony

concerning the duration of grazing.
Subsidiary findings are particularly appropriate in this case
where the Commission admittedly misunderstood the evidence in the
its original Decision.

The process of articulating

subsidiary

findings is critical to a reasoned decision making process and to
appellate review of an agency's decision.6

In light of appellees'

6

In Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Utah App.
1991), this Court described the importance of the process of
stating the basis for an agency's decision:
The

findings

are

an

integral
22

part

of

the

inability to articulate the Tax Commission's reasoning, the Court
should find the Tax Commission findings are inadequate.
H.

Gillmor's Testimony Does Not Establish Compliance With
the Post-1993 Production Requirements.

The Tax Commission's finding of compliance with the Act's
production requirements is based solely on its computation of AUM
capacity and AUM usage. Decision at p. 11-12.

Mayflower however

suggests that Gillmor's testimony fulfilled its burden of proving
compliance with the post-1993 production requirements. Mayflower
Brief at 15. Interestingly, the Tax Commission, for the first time
in this appeal, suggests that it own decision below should be
sustained based on Gillmor's testimony. Tax Commission Brief at 45.
Gillmor's testimony however cannot be used to correct the errors
in the Tax Commission's computation of AUMs.
Contrary to appellees' suggestion, the Gillmor testimony does
not evidence compliance with the production requirements for all
Mayflower's property.

Gillmor's testimony concerning capacity and

logical process a tribunal must go through in
reaching a decision. . . Once an administrative
agency attempts to state its findings, identify
the applicable law, and articulate its logic,
it may discover that critical facts are not
properly before it, that the law is other than
anticipated, or that its initial logic is
flawed. In such situations, a result contrary
to the initial conclusions of the body may be
dictated. The process of articulation clearly
enhances
the
agency
self-discipline
and
protects against arbitrary and capricious
decisions. Without the safeguard of adequate
findings, there is no guarantee that the agency
followed a logical process in reaching its
decision.
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production focused on the different areas found on Exhibit 2, copy
of which is attached to this brief.
First, Gillmor testified concerning his usage of the Mayflower
property excluding the South Mountains. This property was in white
on the map. With respect to this area, he testified to using a
substantial portion of the property's capacity. (Tr./Gillmor p. 40
1. 3-18)
Second, Gillmor testified concerning the blue shaded area, the
South Mountains.

He stated that the land itself had not changed

in this area and grew the same amount of feed.

He however stated

that the land could not be grazed because of the encroachment of
civilization. (Tr./Gillmor p. 41-42).
As can be seen from the record, Gillmor did not testify to
using half the capacity of all Mayflower property including the
South Mountains. The South Mountains had the demonstrated capacity
to sustain a large herd for a whole grazing season.
continued to exist.

This capacity

Gillmor simply did not use this capacity

because of the dogs and other activity in and around the area.
Thus, Gillmor f s testimony establishes that he did not use half of
the capacity of the South Mountains.
Even if Gillmor's testimony arguably supported Mayflower's
position, it could not provide the basis for affirming the Tax
Commission's findings.

The Tax Commission's finding of compliance

with the production requirements was based on an AUM computation,
not Gillmor's testimony about capacity and usage.

It is not the

Court's role to make findings using Gillmor's testimony.
24

See

generally Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah App. 1991).
III. MAYFLOWER IS LIABLE FOR THE ROLLBACK TAX BECAUSE OF AN ABSENCE
OF AGRICULTURAL USE ON THE SOUTH MOUNTAINS.
Under § 59-2-506, the absence of agricultural use on the South
Mountains triggers the roll-back tax.

Mayflower however claims

that the County has waived its right to roll back tax by relying
only on the "post 1992 test."
assertion is nonsense.

Mayflower Brief at p. 2-3.

This

The County Opening Brief did not rely only

on the post-1993 statute to show the absence of agriculture use in
the South Mountains.

County y s Opening Brief at 24-25 (citing to

the Utah Constitution, the pre-1993 Act, and the post-1993 Act).
The Court should therefore disregard Mayflower's waiver claims.
CONCLUSION
The

uncontroverted

facts

establish

that

beginning

in

approximately 1989, Gillmor stopped herding sheep into the South
Mountains and affirmatively tried to keep them out of that area.
Thereafter, whenever animals would wander into the South Mountains,
Gillmor would quickly retrieve them.

Based on these facts, the

Court should reverse the Tax Commission finding that agricultural
use existed on the South Mountain and enter judgment for the County
imposing the roll back tax.
If the South Mountains are deemed to be actively devoted to
an

agricultural

purpose,

then

Mayflower

has

failed

to

compliance with the production requirements of the post-1993

25

prove

Farmland Assessment Act. In this event, the County is entitled to
a judgment removing all of Mayflower's property from greenbelt.

DATED this 18th day of November, 1996.

^^^OSEP^TT'DU^BECK, JR.
Attorney for Board of Equalizatic
Wasatch County
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ADDENDUM

